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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SALT LAKE CITY,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 950173-CA
DAVID LEE MCCLAIN
Priority No. 2
Defendant/Appellant,

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction

is conferred on this Court by Article VIII,

Section 5 of the Utah Constitution, and by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(f)(1994) which permits a defendant in a circuit court criminal
action to Appeal to the Court of Appeals for reversal of a final
judgment and conviction for any crime other that first degree or
capital felony.

STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The pertinent

parts of

the following

statues

Addenda:
Salt Lake City Code § 12.24.100
Salt Lake City Code § 12.52.350
Salt Lake City Code § 12.52.360
Art. I, Sec. 7, Utah Constitution
Amend. V, United States Constitution

are provided

in

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1..

Did the trial judge's denial of defendant's request for a

short

recess

which

would

allow

the

defendant

to

present

an

important witness violate the defendant's right to due process?
STANDARD OF REVIEW.

A trial

judge's decision

to deny a

request for a recess shall only be overturned if it was an abuse of
discretion.
1987);

Beverly v. Cardinal , 743 P.2d 442, 443

Elliot

v.

Kundahl,

574

P.2d

732,

734

(Colo.App.

(Wash.

1978);

Slavenburcr v. Bautts, 561 P.2d 423, 426 (Kan. 1977).
This issued was preserved below.
2.

R. 134-36, 188-91.

Did the trial judge's denial of defendant's request to reopen

his case to present an important witness violate the defendant's
right to due process?
STANDARD OF REVIEW.

A trial judge's decision

to deny a

request to reopen a party's case will only be overturned if it was
an abuse of discretion.

Gardner v. Christensen, 622 P.2d 782, 784

(Utah 1980).
This issue was preserved below.
3.

R. 188-91.

Did the trial judge used the incorrect standard in determining

whether to include the defendant's lesser included instruction?
STANDARD OF REVIEW.

A trial court's refusal to give a lesser

included instruction is a question of law, and will be reviewed for
correctness, giving no particular deference to the trial court.
State v. Diaz, 859 P.2d 19, 24 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Hamilton,
827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992).
This issue was preserved below.
2

R. 185-187.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
On February 15, 1995, a jury found the defendant guilty on
four counts: (1) Driving under the influence in violation of Salt
Lake City Code § 12.24.100, (2) Driving on a divided section in
violation of Salt Lake City Code § 12.44.110, (3) Improper lane
change in violation of Salt Lake City Code § 12.44.060, and (4)
Open Container of alcohol in a vehicle in violation of Salt Lake
City Code § 12.44.070.

Index of Proceedings.

The defendant was

sentenced and judgment was entered on the same day.
Proceedings.

Index of

On March 7, 1995, the defendant filed his notice of

appeal of these convictions.

Other facts relevant to this section

are stated elsewhere in the brief.

See infra Statement of the

Facts.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On September 10th, 1994 at approximately 11:00 p.m., Officer
Kenneth D. Dailey, Jr. ("Officer Dailey") and Officer Roger Kent
Williams,

while

on

motorcycles,

southbound on State Street.

spotted

R. 81-83.

a

vehicle

driving

At approximately

1930

South, they observed the vehicle make a U-turn across a raised
island, go into the mid-lane and then back into the inside lane.
R. 83.

The vehicle then drove up onto the island and back down

before entering the left turn lane for Coatsville Avenue.

R. 84.

The vehicle did not turn immediately, even though the officers did
not observe anything preventing the driver from doing so.

R. 86.

The vehicle then turned in front of the oncoming car, causing the
3

car to slow down.

R. 87.

followed the vehicle.

The officers activated their lights and

R. 88.

After a quarter of a block, the

officers engaged their sirens.
near the end of the block.
Officer
McClain").

Dailey
R. 90.

R. 148.

The vehicle pulled over

R. 88.

approached

the

driver,

David

McClain("Mr.

Officer Dailey testified that he smelled the

strong odor of alcohol and that Mr. McClain's speech was slurred.
R.

90-91.

Officer Dailey also noted that Mr. McClain

swayed

continuously and that his eyes were red and watery and his pupils
were large.

R. 90-91

Officer Dailey attempted to administer field sobriety test,
but Mr. McClain was unable to do them.

R. 95-99.

A couple of open

containers of beer were found in the vehicle, and Mr. McClain
admitted to drinking one beer.
take the breathalyzer test.

R. 91, 143. Mr. McClain refused to

R. 100-01.

Mr. McClain testified that he has diabetes and that he was
suffering from low blood sugar at the time.

R. 157-62.

He stated

that low blood sugar cause him to be disoriented, that he gets
shaky, that he starts to slur his speech and that sometimes he even
goes unconscious.

R. 158.

He also stated that the reason he

refused the breathalyzer test was that he was afraid it would
register the medication he takes for diabetes.

R.

161.

Mr.

McClain does not know how the open containers of beer got in his
car.

R. 160.

He used to lend his car out and speculates that one

of his friends put them in the car.

R. 160-61.

However, he said

that his medication had never affected his driving before.
4

R. 162.

Mr. McClain's physician, Dr. Edwards, agreed to testify on
behalf of Mr. McClain.

R. 189-90.

Dr. Edwards was going to

testify that Mr. McClain has diabetes and the low blood sugar can
cause disorientation and slurred speech and can affect the motor
skills of the afflicted person.

R. 190.

However, Dr. Edwards

could only come in to testify at 4:00 in the afternoon.

R. 189-90.

The defense finished with all of its available evidence at
about 3:10 p.m. The trial court refused to wait until 4:00 p.m. so
the defendant could present Dr. Edwards as a witness.

R. 171.

Counsel for the defense objected, but the court made it clear that
it would not wait, so the defense rested.

R. 190-91.

Dr. Edwards

arrived during the reading of the jury instructions.

R. 191.

Counsel for the defense again requested that he be given a chance
to put Dr. Edwards on the stand.
this request.
The

court

R. 188, 191.

The court rejected

R. 186-87.
also

refused

Defendant's

request

for

a

lesser

included instruction for Reckless Driving.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial judge abused her discretion, when she denied Mr.
McClain's request for a recess of less than an hour in order for
him to present a witness that was critical to his defense.

Mr.

McClain's ability to adequately defend himself and to be given a
fair trial were compromised by the trial court's decision.

This is

especially true in light of the reasonableness of the request. Mr.

5

McClain's need for this witness was great and his request was
minimal.

Mr. McClain's recess should have been granted.

It was a further abuse of discretion for the trial judge to
have denied Mr. McClain's request to reopen his case to present the
testimony of that same witness.

The request was reasonable, and

the trial judge's actions denied Mr. McClain the right to a fair
trial.
Finally,

the

trial

judge

improperly

denied Mr.

McClain's

lesser included instruction for the offense of reckless driving.
The trial judge used the improper
in deciding this question.

"necessarily included" standard

Under the proper

"evidence based"

standard Mr. McClain's lesser included instruction should have been
included.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL JUDGE'S DENIAL OF MR. MCCLAIN'S REQUEST FOR A SHORT
RECESS IN ORDER FOR HIM TO PRESENT AN IMPORTANT WITNESS
VIOLATED HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AND TO DUE PROCESS.
Mr. McClain's right to a fair trial was violated, when he was

prevented from calling an important witness and forced to close his
case early.

A person shall not "be deprived of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law." U.S. Const, amend. V. ; Utah
Const. Art. I, § 7.

An important part of due process of law, and

the right to a fair trial, is "an opportunity to defend."
Maestas,

815 P.2d

1319, 1325

Werner, 810 P. 2d 469, 472

(Utah App. 1991);

(Utah App. 1991) .

State v.

Provo City v.

The defendant was

denied this opportunity to defend when the trial court denied the
6

defendant's request for a short recess in order for the defendant
to present an essential witness to his case, and the defendant was
forced to rest his case early.

A.

Mr. McClain's request for a delay in the trial was in the
nature of a recess and not a continuance

The review of a trial court's decision involving a request for
a

recess, as

opposed

to

a continuance

is

an

issue

of

first

impression in this state.
Black's Law Dictionary defines recess as:
In the practice of the courts, a short interval or
period of time during which the court suspends business,
but without adjourning. The period between sessions of
court. A temporary [adjournment] of a trial or a hearing
that occurs after a trial or hearing has commenced.
State v. Charles, La., 350 So.2d 595, 598.
1269 (6th ed. 1990).
Black's Law Dictionary defines recess as:
The adjournment or postponement of a session, hearing,
trial, or other proceeding to a subsequent day or time;
usually on the request or motion of one of the parties.
321 (6th ed. 1990).
Mr. McClain's request in this case is in the nature of a
recess and not a request for a continuance.
testifying on his own behalf at 3:10 p.m.

Mr. McClain finished
R. 171, 190.

Mr.

McClain's next witness Dr. Edwards was not going to be present to
testify until 4:00 p.m.

R. 134-35, 188-91.

At this point, Mr.

McClain requested a delay of the trial of only fifty minutes.
135, 171. This request was for a short interval.

R.

The request came

after the trial had commenced, and the request did not require an
7

adjournment to another day.

Because of its temporary nature, the

delay requested would have to be considered a recess rather than a
continuance.
The granting of a continuance is at the discretion of the
trial judge.

State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982) .

And a trial judge's decision regarding a continuance will not be
reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.

Id.

The defendant concedes that the granting of a recess should
also be at the discretion of the trial judge. Beverly v. Cardinal,
743 P. 2d 442, 443
732, 734

(Colo.App. 1987); Elliot v. Kundahl, 574 P. 2d

(Wash. 1978); Slavenburg v. Bautts, 561 P.2d 423, 426

(Kan. 1977).
Whether a trial judge abused his discretion should be looked
at more closely when a fundamental right is at issue.
Spears, 474 N.E.2d 1189, 1190 (N.Y. 1984).

People v.

And when it is found

that a trial judge's discretionary decision denies the defendant a
constitutional right, that decision should always be considered an
abuse of discretion.

Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Horton, 797

S.W.2d 677, 680 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1990).

Mr. McClain was denied

his constitutional right to due process.
Further, what

is required to find an abuse of discretion

should be lower for a request for a recess, than that required for
a continuance.

This request would not have required the court to

reschedule any other matters.

A short recess places less of a

burden on the court" than a continuation of the trial to another
day.
8

The chance of any prejudice to the opposing party is also
unlikely when a short recess is requested.
a recess of less than an hour.

A 50 minute recess would not have

caused any prejudice to the city.
to re-subpoena any witnesses.

Mr. McClain requested

The city would not be required

The city's witnesses would not have

had to take any additional time off.

And it is highly unlikely

that any possible rebuttal witnesses7 memories would have faded as
the result of a fifty minute recess.
The reason given for the denial by the trial judge, that the
jury would be required to serve longer is only speculative.

It is

possible that the testimony of Dr. Edwards could have made the
jury's deliberation easier.

Dr. Edward's testimony could have

shortened the jury's deliberation, thereby shortening their time of
service.

So one can not say that the recess would have required

the jury to serve any longer.

An at most it would have caused them

to serve only fifty more minutes.1
from 4:15 p.m. to 6:15 p.m.

The jury served for two hours,

R. 58.

This was not a request for time so Mr. McClain could try and
find a speculative witness, who may not even show up.

The witness

was identified, and he was going to be present to testify at the
end of the requested recess.

And he was available to testify at

the time the requested recess would have ended.
1

The time that would have been required for Dr. Edwards to
testify should not be counted against the defendant.
If Dr.
Edwards had been available to testify at 3:10 p.m., any denial of
Dr. Edwards' testimony because it would have delayed the trial
would have most certainly been an abuse of discretion. Therefore,
it is the time of the recess and not the time that it would have
taken Dr. Edward's to testify which is at issue.
9

While a trial court should try to keep a trial running in an
orderly fashion, this should not be done at the expense of justice.
Rutzen v. Pertile, 527 N.E.2d 603, 608 (Ill.App. 2 Dist. 1988).
The court's goal at trial should be the search for truth, not that
the trial finish at five o'clock sharp.
Erickson, 398 N.W. 732, 734
create

"an appearance

Great Plains Supply Co. v.

(N.D. 1986) .

The court should not

of unfairness" by

rushing

to

judgment.

Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Horton, 797 S.W.2d 677, 681 (Tex.App.Texarkana 1990) .
While the decision to grant a recess is an issue of first
impression in Utah, several other jurisdictions have dealt with the
issue.

In those cases it was found to be an abuse of discretion to

not grant a short recess to allow a witness to testify.
v. Bautts, 561 P. 2d 423
automobile

negligence

Slavenburv

(Kan. 1977) (Abuse of discretion, in an

case,

to

not

grant

a

recess

to

allow

defendant's medical witness to testify); Elliot v. Kundahl, 574
P.2d 732 (Wash. 1978)(In a wrongful death action, it was an abuse
of discretion to deny a recess of 75 minutes so plaintiff could
present

a medical

(Colo.App.

expert); Beverly v. Cardinal,

1987)(Abuse

of

discretion

in

743

automobile

P.2d

442

negligence

action when trial court denied a recess of less than two hours to
allow the defendant to present a witness subpoenaed for later in
the day);

Simon v. Goldberg, 332 N.Y.S.2d 214

discretion to deny a recess from 11:15 a.m.
treating physicians could testify);

(1972)(Abuse of

to 2:00 p.m.,

so

O'Malley v. City of New York,

229 N.Y.2d 489 (1962) (Abuse of discretion to not grant a recess for
10

a reasonable time to allow a medical examiner, who was on his way,
to testify); Photo 60 of Miami International v. Roundtree, 541
So.2d 687 (Fla.App. 3 Dist. 1989); see also, Jarvis v. Stoddart,
213 N.Y.S. 829 (1926); Herbert v. Garner, 78 So.2d 729 (Fla 1955);
Pepe v. Urban, 78 A.2d 406 (N.J. 1951).
As in Mr. McClain's case, almost all the witnesses in the
above cases were doctors.
dilemma

created

by

The Supreme Court of Kansas noted the

doctors

as witness.

"The

expert

medical

witness. . . is often engulfed in a demanding professional practice
which because of tight schedules and unforeseeable emergencies,
makes it difficult to appear at a time convenient to court and
counsel.

Slavenburg, at 427.

Just because doctors are difficult

to schedule should not mean that the courts should move heaven and
earth to accommodate them. However, because of these difficulties,
reasonable

requests,

involving what

time

they

are

allowed

to

testify at, should be granted.
The Supreme Court of Kansas in dealing with the issue of
whether a trial court should grant a recess so a witness could
testify, developed several factors that a court should weigh in
making this decision.
(1) Counsel's diligence and effort
to gain
attendance of the witness; (2) the reason the witness is
not present; (3) the nature of the witness's expected
testimony; (4) whether the testimony is critical evidence
or merely cumulative; (5) the amount of delay expected;
(6) the effect of the delay on the docket of the trial
court; and (7) the overall injustice which might result
if the delay were denied.
Slavenburg, at 428.
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(1) and (2) Counsel for Mr. McClain had arranged to have Dr.
Edwards

to be present

at trial, granted

it was at 4:00

p.m.

Counsel proffered to the court, that he had informed Dr. Edward's
that he would be testifying in the afternoon.

Dr. Edward's told

counsel that he would not be able to testify until 4:00
Counsel did not subpoena

Dr. Edwards.

R. 134, 189-90.

p.m.

However

Dr. Edwards was a willing witness, and counsel explained that to
save his office(The Salt Lake Legal Defender Association) expense
he did not have him subpoenaed.

R. 190.

A subpoena is not required even for a motion to continue.
Just a showing that the witness could actually be produced and that
counsel exercised due diligence is all that is needed.
Creviston, 646 P. 2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982)
that but so could other facts.

State v.

A subpoena may help prove

In this case Counsel proffered to

the court that Dr. Edwards would be available at 4:00 p.m. R. 134
And in fact, Dr. Edwards did arrive prior to 4:00 p.m.
191.

R. 18 8,

The lack of a subpoena should also be weighed against the

type of request.
continuance

to

Mr. McClain only asked for a short recess, not a
another

day.

Further,

any

possible

error

in

judgment by counsel in not subpoenaing Dr. Edwards does not justify
the drastic measure taken by the trial court.

See, Elliott v.

Kundall, 574 P.2d 732 (Wash 1978).
(3)

Dr. Edward's was going to testify that Mr. McClain did

indeed have diabetes.

R. 190. And that a diabetic suffering from

low blood sugar can become disoriented, have slurred speech and
have trouble with his motor coordination.
12

R. 190.

(4)

Mr.

McClain

influence ("DUI") .

was

charged

with

driving

Salt Lake City Code § 12.24.100.

under

the

The defense

presented by Mr. McClain, was that he was a diabetic, that he was
suffering from low blood sugar, and it was the low blood sugar that
caused him to behave the way he did and not alcohol. R. 162, 17782.

Mr. McClain intended to present his personal physician, Dr.

Edwards,

who

condition.

would

R. 190.

have

confirmed

the

Mr.

McClain's

diabetic

Dr. Edwards would have also testified that low

blood sugar causes systems similar to those suffered by
under

the

influence. R.

clarified

whether

these symptoms.

the

190.

Further,

defendant's

Dr. Edwards

medication

would

issue

of

could
have

have

caused

A person can be found guilty of a DUI on the basis

that they were under the influence of medication.
the

someone

medication

was

extremely

In this case,

crucial.

During

deliberation, the jury sent a question to the judge asking if it
was possible to find the defendant guilty of DUI on the basis of
his medication.
suggests

that

medication.

R.
the

23.

This question

defendant's

from the

conviction

was

jury
based

strongly
on

the

Dr. Edward's testimony on the medication would have

been crucial.
(5)
factor,

The
and

it

amount

of

carries

expected was minimal.

delay
the

expected

most

weight.

is

the
The

most
amount

important
of

delay

Only a recess of 50 minutes was requested.

Even if the other factors do not weigh favorably for the defendant
the fact that the requested recess was so short should off set any
concerns.
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(6)

The requested recess would not have had any effect on the

docket of the trial court.

The only possible effect is that the

trial may have been 50 minutes longer.
(7)

The overall injustice that resulted from the denial of

the recess is that the defendant was prevented from presenting a
crucial witness.

Because of this the defendant was unable to fully

present his defense and his right to due process was violated.
Weighing
McClain's

due

the

reasonableness

process

right

of

the

to present

request

Dr.

against

Edwards,

the

Mr.
trial

court's denial of the recess was an abuse of discretion.

B.

It was an abuse of discretion to deny Mr. McClain's
requested recess even under the standards required for a
continuance.

Even if Mr. McClain's request was for a continuance

rather

than a recess, it still was an abuse of discretion to deny

the

request.

her

The

trial

judge

may

be

found

to

have

abused

discretion in not granting a continuance, "where a party has made
timely objections, given necessary notice and made a
effort

to have the trial date reset

Crevistion,

646

P.2d

750,

752

reasonable

for good cause."

(Utah

1982) .

When

State v.
a

criminal

defendant requests a continuance in order to obtain the presence of
a witness, the defendant "must show the testimony is material and
admissible, that the witness could actually be produced, that the
witness could be produced within a reasonable time, and that due
diligence has been exercised before the request for a continuance.
Id.

14

Mr. McClain made timely objections, gave reasonable notice and
made a reasonable effort to have the trial delayed for good cause.
Prior to the noon recess, Mr. McClain had made the trial judge
aware that Dr. Edwards would not be able to testify until 4:00 p.m.
R. 134.

At this point in the trial the trial judge indicated that

if the defendant had finished with his other witnesses close to
4:00 p.m., the trial judge would be willing to take a short recess.
R. 134.

The trial judge further stated that if the defendant

finished at 3:00 p.m. or earlier she would not be willing to delay
the trial. At this point it was not clear when the defendant would
be finished with all his witnesses except Dr. Edwards. However the
trial judge was aware that a recess may be necessary.

It was not

until 3:10 p.m. when the defendant finished testifying that counsel
and the trial judge knew a recess would need to take place if Dr.
Edwards

was

going

to

testify.

R.

171,

190.

Under

these

circumstances Mr. McClain made timely objections, gave reasonable
notice, and made a reasonable effort to have the trial delayed (not
reset) for good cause.
Dr. Edward's testimony would have been material. Testimony is
material "if there is a reasonable probability that its presence
would effect the outcome of the trial."

State v. Schreuder, 712

P. 2d 264, 275 (Utah 1985) . As argued earlier Dr. Edwards testimony
was

crucial

significant

to

Mr.

McClain7 s

credibility.

For

defense
the

same

and

would

have

reasons, Dr.

Edward's

testimony was relevant to the case and therefore admissible.
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added

The city's only objection to Dr. Edward's testimony was that
it would be cumulative.

R. 188-89.

Mr. McClain testified that he

had diabetes and he stated what having low blood sugar would do to
him.

However, Mr. McClain is not a doctor.

have added

And Dr. Edwards would

credibility to Mr. McClain's defense.

In all the

automobile negligence cases cited earlier, the parties could have
testified to their own injuries.

Yet

medical experts were still

considered material witnesses.
And as argued earlier, Dr. Edwards could actually be produced
and was in fact produced.
time.

And he could be produced in a reasonable

In this case, less than an hour.

And due diligence was

exercised before the request for a continuance.
II.

IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO HAVE
DENIED THE DEFENDANT'S REQUEST TO REOPEN HIS CASE TO PRESENT
THE TESTIMONY OF DR. EDWARDS.
It was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to have

denied Mr.McClain's request to reopen his case and present the
testimony of Dr. Edwards. A trial judge has discretion in deciding
whether to allow a party to reopen his case in order to present
further evidence.
1980) .

Gardner v. Christensen, 622 P.2d 782, 784 (Utah

"Nevertheless, such discretion may not be exercised in a

capricious and arbitrary manner which produces an inequitable or
unjust result."

Id.

After the defense had rested, the trial judge read the jury
instructions.

R. 190-91.

Dr. Edwards arrived.

Prior to finishing those instructions,

R. 190-91

The trial judge finished the

instructions at about 5 minutes to 4:00 p.m.
16

R. 191.

Defense

counsel approached the bench and requested that he be given an
opportunity to reopen his case and let Dr. Edwards testify.
172, 188.

The trial judge denied the request.

proceeded to closing arguments.

R.

Counsels then

R. 188, 191.

As argued earlier, on the issue of the trial judge's denial of
defendant's request

for a recess, the trial judge's denial of

Mr.McClain's request to reopen his case, denied Mr. McClain an
opportunity to present a crucial witness for his defense.
addition, no delay or recess was needed at this point.

In

The 50

minutes requested earlier were taken up by the reading of jury
instructions.

So the trial judges concern that the trial would be

delayed was no longer an issue.
The only concern of the trial judge at this point was that the
prosecutor had released his witnesses and could not present any
rebuttal to Dr. Edwards.

R. 191.

However the only witnesses that

the prosecutor presented were two police officers. And considering
what Dr. Edwards was going to testify to it is hard to conceive
what the officer's could have said in rebuttal, since they are not
medical experts.
III. THE TRIAL JUDGE IMPROPERLY DENIED MR. MCCLAIN'S LESSER
INCLUDED INSTRUCTION WHEN SHE USED THE INCORRECT STANDARD IN
DETERMINING WHETHER MR. MCCLAIN WAS ENTITLED TO THAT
INSTRUCTION.
The

trial

instruction

judge

denied

on the basis

Mr.

McClain's

it did not

rather

than

the

fulfill
correct

lesser
the

included"

standard,

standard.

State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983).

included

"necessarily

evidence

based

Mr. McClain

was charged with Driving under the influence of alcohol and/or
17

drugs.

Mr. McClain requested a lesser included instruction on the

offense of reckless driving.

R. 186.

Both offenses are provided

for under the Salt Lake City Code.
12.24.100. Driving Under the Influence of Drugs and
Intoxicants prohibited.
A. It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this
section for any person to operate or be in actual physical
control of a vehicle within this city . . . if the person is
under the influence of alcohol or any drug, or the combined
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which renders
the person incapable of safely driving a vehicle within the
city.
Salt Lake City Code.
12.52.350. Reckless Driving - Prohibited.
Any person who drives any vehicle in wilful or wanton
disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of
reckless driving.
Salt Lake City Code.
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah
1983), clarified the appropriate standard for determining whether
a defendant is entitled to a lesser included instruction.

The

Court found that there are two different standards for determining
whether a court should include a lesser included instruction.

The

"necessarily

two

included"

standard,

the

more

narrow

of

the

standards, requires that all the elements of the lesser standard be
found in the greater charge.
charge
charge.

can not

Jd. at 155.

include any elements not

The lesser included
found

in the

greater

However, this standard only applies to lesser included

instructions submitted by the prosecution.

Id. at 156.

This is

because the defendant is entitled to notice of the elements against
which he has to defend.

The prosecution can not be allowed to

bring in new elements in a lesser included instruction that the
18

defendant was not aware of previously.
be

applied

instruction.

to

a

defendant's

A different standard is to

request

for

a

lesser

included

This standard requires that there be some overlap in

the elements of the greater and lesser included charges, and that
the evidence presented at trial provide "a rational basis for a
verdict

acquitting

the

defendant

of

the

convicting him of the included offense."

offense

Id.

charged

and

at 158.

The trial judge held that reckless driving was not a lesser
included

offense

to DUI, because

included an additional element.
requirement

of

willful

and

the

R. 187.

wanton

reckless

driving

charge

The new element was the

intent.

This

decision

obviously based on the "necessarily included" standard.

is

Since it

was the defendant's requested instruction, the trial judge should
have used the "evidence based" standard.

Id.

While both offenses are punishable as class B misdemeanors, a
DUI is a greater charge than reckless driving.
substantial
compare,

mandatory

sentencing

12.53.360.

In

requirements.

addition,

DUI's

DUI's have more
12.24.100 (D),
have

collateral

consequences including the possibility of enhancing any subsequent
DUI conviction. 12.24.100(E); Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (5) , (6) , (7)
(1953 as amended), compare, 12.53.360. So even though both charges
are class B misdemeanors, the mandatory sentencing requirements,
the possible

collateral

consequences, and any possible

stigma, make a DUI a greater charge than reckless driving.
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social

Both offenses have overlapping elements.

In both cases the

prosecution would have to prove that the defendant was operating
his vehicle in an unsafe manner.
The evidence presented at trial provided a rational basis for
a verdict acquitting the defendant
of reckless driving.

of the DUI and convicting him

The trial judge is not supposed weigh the

evidence, in making this determination, since that is for the trier
of fact to decide.

Baker, at 159.

determine

there

"whether

is a

The trial judge only needs to

sufficient

quantum

of

presented to justify sending the question to the jury."
159.

evidence
Jd. at

Also if the evidence is ambiguous and subject to alternative

interpretations, and one of those interpretations would include
finding the defendant guilty of the lesser included instead of the
greater offense, then that charge must be included as a lesser
included instruction.

JEd. The trial judge must view the evidence

and the inferences that can be drawn in a light most favorable to
the defendant when making this decision.

State v. Velarde, 734

P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1986).
There was plenty of evidence presented at trial that
defendant drove his vehicle in a unsafe manner.
across his lane and onto the divider.

the

He made a u-turn

And he made a left turn in

front of another vehicle.
The main issue of contention at trial was what caused Mr.
McClain's conduct.

The prosecution argued that it was alcohol and

or drugs that caused Mr. McClain's behavior.

Mr. McClain however

provided a reasonable explanation for his driving, that did not
20

include alcohol or drugs.

And that explanation was his natural

condition of being a diabetic, and that as part of that condition
he was suffering from low blood sugar which caused him to drive
erratically and to perform poorly on the field sobriety tests.
And while low blood sugar would explain his driving pattern,
it does not necessarily excuse Mr. McClain's conduct.

The jury

could have found that Mr. McClain should not have continued driving
once he started to suffer from low blood sugar.

On this basis the

jury could have held that Mr. McClain continued to drive in a
willful or wanton disregard for the safety of others. Therefore he
was guilty of reckless driving.
The evidence presented at trial, when looked at in a light
most

favorable

to

the

defendant

did

provide

a

reasonable

explanation for why the defendant was not guilty of DUI, but was
guilty of reckless driving.

And it appears that the jury had some

question whether the defendant was guilty of a DUI. The jury asked
whether the defendant could be found guilty based on his medication
rather that alcohol. R. 23. The fact that they questioned whether
alcohol was involved, suggests that they may have questioned the
DUI, and may have gone for a reckless driving instruction.
of

this the

trial

judge should have

included

the

Because

defendant's

requested instruction.

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND WRITTEN OPINION
No Utah appellate court has yet addressed the issue of a trial
court denying a defendant's request
21

for a recess.

The

issue

involves Mr. McClain's

important

constitutional

rights

to due

process and a fair trial. To provide guidance on how trials should
be managed, especially regarding recess, Mr. McClain requests oral
argument and a written opinion.

CONCLUSION
The trial judge abused her discretion when she prevented Mr.
McClain from presenting a crucial witness to his defense, violating
the defendant's right to due process and a fair trial.

The trial

judge abused her discretion when she denied the defendant's request
for a short recess in order for him to present this witness.

And

she further abused her discretion when she denied the defendant an
opportunity to reopen his case to present this witness to the jury.
Finally, the trial judge erred when she denied the defendant's
lesser included instruction on reckless driving.

The trial judge

used an incorrect standard in denying the instruction.

And under

the correct standard the instruction would have had to be included.
On these grounds the defendant requests that the guilty verdicts be
overturned and a new trial be granted.

Further it is requested

that at this new trial the defendant would be entitled to his
lesser included instruction.
SUBMITTED this

'

day of September, 1995.

jfSZbmi D. 0' CONNELL, JR.
Attorney for Defendant/Appant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I, JOHN D. O'CONNELL JR., hereby certify that I have caused to
be delivered eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of
Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102,
and four copies to the office of the Salt Lake City Prosecutor, 451
South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this

7"

day of

September, 1995.

OAVO'C—/VT
^TOHN D. O'CONNELL JR'.
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
DELIVERED this

day of September, 1995.
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ADDENDA

24

SALT LAKE CITY CODE

12.52J50. Reckless Driving - Prohibited.
Any person who drives any vehicle in
wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of
persons or property is guilty of reckless driving.
Any person guilty of violating this section shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. (Prior code
Title 46, Art. 15 §222)
12.52360. Reckless driving - Penalty.
A. Every person convicted of any violation
of Section 12.52 J 50, or its successor, shall be
punished by imprisonment for a period of not
less than five days nor more than six months or
by a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars nor
more than' one thousand dollars, or by both such
fine and imprisonment
B. On a second or subsequent conviction,
the minimum term of imprisonment shall be not
less than ten days, and the minimum fine not
less than fifty dollars. (Prior code Title 46, Art
15 J 223)

12.24.100. Driving Under The Influence Of
Drugs And Intoxicants Prohibited - Penalties.
A. It is unlawful and punishable as
provided in this section for any person to
operate or be in actual physical control of a
vehicle within this city if the person has a blood
or breath alcohol content of .08 grams or greater
by weight as shown by a chemical test given
within two hours after the alleged operation or
physical control, or if the person is under the
influence of alcohol or any drug, or the
combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a
degree which renders the person incapable of
safely driving a vehicle within the city. The fact
that a person charged with violating this section
is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a
drug does not constitute a defense against any
charge of violating this section.

B. Percent by weight of alcohol in the
blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol per
one hundred cubic centimeters of blood, and the
percent by weight alcohol in the breath shall be
based upon grams of alcohol per two hundred
ten liters of breath.
C. Every person who is convicted the first
time of a violation of subsection A of this
section shall be guilty of a Class B
misdemeanor.
D. I. In addition to the penalties provided
for in subsection C of this section, the court
shall, upon a first conviction, impose either
a. A mandatory jail sentence of not less
than forty-eight consecutive hours nor more
than two hundred forty hours, with emphasis on
serving in the drunk tank of the jail; or
b. Require the person to work in a
community- service work program for not less
than twenty-four hours nor more than fifty
hours.
2. in addition to the requirements of
subsection Dla or D l b above, the court shall
order the person to participate in an assessment
and educational series at a licensed alcohol
rehabilitation facility, at the person's expense.
E. 1. Upon a second conviction within five
years after a first conviction under this section,
in addition to the penalties provided for in
subsection C, the court shall impose either
a. A mandatory jail sentence of not less
than two hundred forty consecutive hours nor
more than seven hundred twenty hours, with
emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the
jail; or
b. Require the person to work in a
community- service work program for not less
than eighty hours nor more than two hundred
forty hours.
2. In addition to the requirements of
subsection Ela or Elb above, the court shall
order the person to participate in an assessment
and educational series at a licensed alcohol
rehabilitation facility, and the court may, in its
discretion, order the person to obtain treatment
at the person's expense at an alcohol
rehabilitation facility.

F. 1. Upon a subsequent conviction within
five years after a second conviction under this
section, in addition to the penalties provided for
in subsection C, the court shall impose either
a. A mandatory jail sentence of not less
than seven hundred twenty nor more than two
thousand one hundred sixty hours, with
emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the

jail; or
b. Require the person to work in a
community- service work project for not less
than eighty hours nor more than seven hundred
twenty hours.
G. In no event shall any combination of
imprisonment and/or community service
imposed under subsections C, D, E and F above
exceed six months' duration.
H. No portion of any sentence imposed
under subsection C shall be suspended, and the
convicted person shall not be eligible for parole
or probation until such time as any sentence
imposed under subsections D, E or F of this
section has been served.
1. 1. When the prosecution agrees to a plea
of guilty or no contest to a charge of a violation
of Section 12.52.350 of this title, or its
successor, in satisfaction of, or as a substitute
for, an original charge of a violation of this
section, the prosecution shall state for the record
a factual basis for the plea, including whether or
not defendant had consumed alcohol or drugs,
or a combination of both, in connection with the
ofTense. The prosecutor's statement shall be an
offer of proof of the facts which show whether
or not defendant had consumed alcohol or
drugs, or a combination of both, in connection
with the offense.
2. The court shall advise the defendant,
before accepting the plea offered under
subsection 11 above, of the consequences of a
violation of Section 12.52 J 50 of this title, or its
successor, in substance as follows: "If the court
accepts the defendant's plea of guilty or no
contest to a charge of violating said Section
12.52 J50, and the prosecutor states for the
record that there was consumption of alcohol or
drugs, or a combination of both, by the
defendant in connection with the offense, the

resulting conviction shall be a prior offense for
the purpose of subsections E and F of this
section."
J. A peace officer may, without a warrant,
arrest a person for a violation of this section
when:
1. The violation is coupled with an
accident or collision in which the person is
involved; or
2. The officer has reasonable cause to
believe a violation has in fact been committed
by the person, although not in the officer's
presence.
K. This Section 12.24.100 was enacted to
be in harmony with and, in substance, the same
as Section 41-6-44, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended, or its successor. (Ord. 82-87 ( l f
1987; prior code Title 46, A r t 6 } 105)

UTAH CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE I .

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel,
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his
own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
1896

UNITED STATE CONSTITUTION

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning —
Due process of law and just compensation
clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.

